

LUMPY INVESTMENT IN STICKY INFORMATION GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM*

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OBJECTIVE: provide a micro-founded Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with only one type of rigidity – sticky information.

THE MODEL: Mankiw and Reis (07) sticky information general equilibrium model augmented with a set of firms that make capital investment decisions inattentively, as in **Verona (13)**. Consumption, wage, price and capital investment decisions are based, to a certain degree, on old information.

3. THE STICKY-INFORMATION EQUATIONS



FINDINGS: the model with pervasive inattentiveness is better at matching business cycle moments than an otherwise identical model with only a subset of these informational frictions.

1. INTRODUCTION



Information cost: cost of collecting and processing information and making

Baseline calibration (quarter): $\lambda = 0.52$, $\delta = 0.08$, $\omega = 0.74$ Reis (09) Sveen and Weinke (07)

4. RESULTS

Aggregate output and investment, U.S. post-86 data vs models

		standard	autocorrelation coefficients			correlation		
series		deviation				$(investment_t, output_{t+k})$		
			1	2	3	-1	0	1
	U.S. data	0.90	0.93	0.76	0.52			
output	model ($\eta = 1$)	4.34	0.35	0.30	0.29			
	model ($\eta = 0.1$)	2.67	0.90	0.83	0.79			
invest-	U.S. data	4.84	0.93	0.75	0.51	0.82	0.91	0.90
ment	model ($\eta = 1$)	5.39	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.86	0.22
	model ($\eta = 0.1$)	2.40	0.71	0.56	0.46	0.41	0.61	0.56

decisions and plans based on that information (Reis 06a,b)

- cost in money and time of obtaining and assimilating information
- opportunity cost of taking time to think about and to compute optimal plans
 Verona (13): information cost induces the firm to be inattentive and to make infrequent investment decisions
- \rightarrow when inattentive, the firm undertakes continuous (*e.g.* maintenance) investment to compensate for depreciation
- → when the firm updates its information, it reacts to all the information since its last observation date, and the capital stock jumps to the new optimal level ~ periods of low activity interrupted by large capital adjustments
 - \Rightarrow New Micro-foundation for Lumpy Investment:

INFORMATION COST OR INATTENTIVENESS

2. THE DSGE MODEL WITH STICKY INFORMATION



Investment moments - sensitivity analysis for different values of η



 \Rightarrow a set δ of consumers, ω of workers, λ of price-setting firms and η of capital-investing firms make their plans every period

0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 $\mathbf{\eta}$

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